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Abstract : 
Healthcare appears to be a world of Evidence-Based Medicine and rational decisions. Seldom 
available, sufficient or relevant in view of human needs, scientific evidence do not address priorities 
when resources are more than ever globally insufficient to an increasingly voracious system. Literature 
shows than evidence are not sufficient while a wide range of “stakeholders” vie to influence the 
decision-making process. 
We will be discussing the part "stakeholders" play in the decision-making process. Using the 
Integrative Social Contract Theory, we will be discussing "hypernorms" and unsolved dilemmas that 
exist within the Healthcare providing system. Using Philips works, we propose a normative and 
derivative approach of stakeholders' expectations in strategic management. We suggest that a 
framework that takes stakeholders' expectations –rather than simply their identities- into account, is a 
prerequisite to managing resource allocation in transparency and making sure that the efficiency 
requirements are acceptable for those stakeholders individually and collectively. 
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Introduction  
In 1946, the newly constituted United Nations Organization founded the World Health Organization. 
The preamble to the Constitution which came into force in 1948, defined health as "a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity", a definition 
that is wide enough to include all aspects of human life, from well-being to deprivation. Creating such 
an organization addresses the morals values of human beings and makes the preservation of well-
being a hypernorm within the community of nations. But good health is not only presented as a "real" 
human right or as an essential aspect of human welfare, it is also a prerequisite to sustaining economic 
and social development, with economic and social development sustaining health, thus giving health a 
wider collective systemic purpose (World Health Organization 2010).  
The most well-known aspect of the larger healthcare system is curative medicine, known as the Health 
Care Provision System (HCPS). Although just one aspect of the "healthcare system"1, it is the one on 
which all attention is focused. Historically dominated by normative ethics that date back to the origins 
of our civilisation (Hippocratic oath), it now represents between 10 and 14% of the GDP of developed 
countries. In such countries, individual solvency has been insured by mutual public or private 
insurance funds, very much akin to a "common resource pool". For years now, the issue of HCPS 
performance has been questioned (World Health Organization 2000), and the share of resources that 
are "disproportionately focusing on the narrow offer of specialized curative care", and "short term 
results" resulting in the "unregulated commercialization of health" has been exposed (World Health 
Organization 2008). The elements required to discuss ethics and business are brought together here, 
with preoccupations focusing on what has been called the "Tragedy of the Commons" (Harding 1968), 
which looks at solutions to manage it in a sustainable way (Ostrom 1999). 
The HCPS appears to be a world of Evidence-Based Medicine and rational decisions, with scientific 
and technical information acting as a neutralizing force on diverging values (Heikkila & Gerlak 2005) 
in resource allocation. But scientific evidence is seldom available, sufficient, or relevant in view of 
human needs, and does not address priorities when resources are more than ever globally insufficient. 
In such cases it is difficult to escape the "messy unfolding of collective action" that turns policy-
making into a "social drama" (Greenhalgh & Russell 2006). Literature shows that evidence is often 
nonexistent and underutilized (Innvaer et al. 2002) (Sorenson et al. 2008) while a wide range of 
"stakeholders" (Angell 1993) including policy-makers, manufacturers, healthcare professionals and 
patients themselves, vie to influence the decision-making process. As controversy appears to be a way 
                                                        
1 Sanitation, water supply and education have been largely promoted by the WHO as a way of increasing the health 
status of the population, and preventing infectious diseases in particular {{90 Wilkinson, R.G. 2003}}, but these are not 
included in what is usually called “health expenses”. 
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of exploring alternatives out of restricted scientific evidence, or to reframe or make sense of such 
evidence (Callon et al. 2001), could "stakeholders" guide us towards more efficiency in what has 
become a major problem for developed countries: that of allocating limited resources within 
increasingly voracious HCPS systems? 
Generally analysed under Stakeholder Theory the claim that healthcare is more of a necessity than 
products and services is a challenge that has begun to blur the line between managerial/organizational 
stakeholder theory and matters of public policy. We have risen to this challenge, knowing full well 
that business is now an integral part of the healthcare system, and widely preoccupied by the 
interactions between both sides of the line. 
Sorenson and al. suggested that relevant "stakeholders" should be more involved in the decision-
making process regarding the approval of new health technologies (Sorenson et al. 2008); the 
acceptance of stakeholders' such as providers and patient in particular being a decisive aspect in terms 
of putting decisions into practices within the healthcare system (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2005). The necessity to consider "stakeholders" for the part they can play 
as performance levers is consistent with the instrumental variation of the theory. As for profit and 
prosperity in business (Jensen 2010) (Jones 1995) (Thomas Donaldson & Preston 1995) (Sternberg 
2000) the cooperation of all "stakeholders" must be obtained in order to reach HCPS value 
requirements (the length and quality of life of patients). Some have suggested that they should be 
ranked according to legitimacy, the urgency of the request or their ability to exert any form of power 
(Mitchell et al. 1997) since they can help achieve the organization's objectives through their influence 
(Freeman 1984).  
But the use of the word "stakeholders" within medical-economics literature often used to mean an 
"influential group" or simply "concerned citizens" merely adds to the confusion. The instrumental 
approach presupposes pre-existing goals to be reached and "stakeholder" management must be a way 
of achieving those goals. How can such a system manage a "common resource pool" and address such 
hypernorms as human life and wellbeing? 
For the past 10 years, we have been exploring the different medical fields (oncology, nephrology, 
geriatrics…) of the French HCPS, and as experts we have participated in several government agency 
and public policy assessment groups. Our research programme, designed to reveal the ins and outs of 
the organization's cost-benefits and the reasons why changes were not made in the past, came to the 
conclusion that institutional requirements simply could not be reached without a more appropriate 
managerial approach, because of the differing "stakeholder" perspectives and expectations.  
We will be discussing "stakeholder" status (1) and the part "stakeholders" play in the decision-making 
process (2). Using the Integrative Social Contract Theory, we will be discussing the question of goals, 
"hypernorms" and unsolved dilemmas that exist within the "macrosocial contracts" that drive HCPS 
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organization. We believe that using the Stakeholder Theory framework should first define the goals 
that will structure the part played by shareholders when this theory is applied to business. (3) Using 
Philips works, we propose a normative and derivative approach of stakeholders' expectations in 
strategic management. We suggest that a framework that takes stakeholders' expectations –rather than 
simply their identities- into account, is a prerequisite to managing resource allocation in total 
transparency and making sure that the efficiency requirements within the decision-making process are 
acceptable. 
1) When do stakeholders act simultaneously as "citizens" determining priorities, 
"levers of performance" and "beneficiaries"? 
Considering "stakeholders" as "citizens" refers to a democratic process aimed at defining those goals. 
The use of the term in the socio-political context could be "unwarranted dilution of stakeholder 
theory", as it has to be useful to produce guidance for managers (Phillips et al. 2003). Is the frontier 
between managerial theory and public choices impenetrable?  What is the decision-making process 
regarding the acceptation or reimbursement of new technology if not the questioning of acceptable 
goals, and the identity and legitimacy of stakeholders that are entitled to expect something from the 
HCPS? In the world of evidence-based medicine, why is positive rationality found lacking when it 
comes to making decisions? What are the goals of such a system? And who defines those goals? Who 
are the "stakeholders"? How are they relevant?  And how legitimate is their taking part in the resource 
allocation process? And how can we expect to improve on the efficiency of resource allocation when 
"stakeholders" are also involved in the process? 
According to a report on Health Technology Assessment (Sorenson et al. 2008), productive and 
skilled "physicians", "health economists" that act as experts in the economic field, "patient group 
representatives" supposed to defend the main concerns of persons or "industries" involved in the 
business side of things, are all equally considered as "stakeholders". More "stakeholders" are needed 
to ensure the "transparency" of decisions and "to be involved in the acceptance process and 
implementation of assessment results". They include "beneficiaries" with patient representatives in a 
position to define what they want for their own sake, physicians and industrialists as performance 
levers for the HCPS and health-economists seeking to improve on efficiency for the sake of resource 
allocation, representatives of "stakeholder-citizens" for the purpose of making democratic decisions, 
and "stakeholder-managers" from an instrumental point of view. But what is the final goal? Effective 
resource allocation is insufficient when it comes to defining which goals participants should be 
striving for.  
In our opinion, this confusion between "stakeholder-citizens" and "stakeholder-managers" does in 
itself partly reveal the difficulty or maybe even the impossibility of eliciting -either definitively or in 
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principle- the goals of the system for pragmatic and ethical reason. It is possible to define general 
goals as the WHO does, and it is also possible to have a technical approach to very operational 
objectives for each individual as recently summarized by Porter.  
In HCPS operations, a public or private hierarchical authority delegates the decision to allocate 
resources according to the decision regarding reimbursement to agencies or supervisory bodies whose 
job it is to rank priorities. They officially use bargaining or rational decision-making based on bio-
medical efficiency and cost-effective ratios. But it is far from covering the entire decision-making 
process governing resource allocation. Deciding who should define priorities for the sake of a 
community is not a technical but a philosophical question, yet it overlooks the crucial issue of resource 
allocation within the HCPS and its many stakeholders vying to defend their own interests. Who is 
capable of choosing between two programmes when one aims to add 10 years to the lives of 100 
people and the other aims to add 3 months to the lives of 4,000 people. "Citizen" and "community 
interests" are all about democracy within the decision-making process.  
There are different ways of organizing this sovereignty. In France, we tend to believe that this question 
is safe in the hands of a public authority, representing the rather obscure notion of a "Republican 
State", which in French culture means a public authority enlightened by humanistic, democratic and 
egalitarian values. This has resulted in highly centralized agencies, overwhelmed by such a wealth of 
strategic plans that any notion of priority seems to have been lost. 
Our belief is that no public or private agency can, on its own, guarantee that decision-making will not 
be appropriated by the most influent, or those with the most bargaining skills, and that local decisions 
will be consistent with the general instructions given by those agencies. The question is not "who" is 
most apt to decide for the sake of a community and its individual members, but "how" we can ensure 
that sufficiently democratic and transparent decisions can emerge from such a complex system. That is 
not to say that agencies aren't able to set rules, but in the building of rules, procedures and concrete 
consequences of daily decisions, agencies must first define a regulated decision-making process before 
deciding to impose substance to the decision that will later be altered to suit local priorities.  
How can Stakeholder Theory help? The theory highlights the legitimacy of the maximization of 
shareholder "model" value and is capable of explicitly addressing morals and ethical values that are 
considered to be necessary to business. What if we question the legitimacy of such values in a field 
historically dominated by ethics and those used to address economic constraints? We believe that the 
different aspects of stakeholder theory, namely the problem of defining the organization's goals, 
fairness among participants and the legitimacy of expectations are relevant to understanding such a 
system. 
The institutions, actors, and financial systems that supervise the HCPS are structured differently in 
different countries, ranging from universal coverage systems to private contractor insurance markets, 
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from mainly publicly supervised providers to free market operators, including specialized companies, 
mainly dominated by private, not-for-profit organizations. But in our opinion they have the same 
decision-making process dilemmas.  
2) Irreconcilable "hypernorms" and the unavoidable priority-related discussions 
regarding "macrosocial contracts" that make up HCPS in democratic 
countries 
Despite the breadth of a concept capable of embracing a large range of people, Stakeholder Theory 
includes a hyper-legitimacy that is seen as a hypernorm, and has consequences on "macrosocial 
contracts": the shareholder's right of property. Embedded as a Weberian legal rational legitimacy or as 
a social consensus, it considered the pre-existence of organizational goals before any discussion about 
resource allocation. When shareholder supremacy is discussed, the main question is not "who" the 
organization should be serving, but "who else, other than shareholders" should the organization be 
serving. Yet, when considering the HCPS, the very question of the "macrosocial contract" relies on 
defining "who" should be served before any other consideration.  
There is no such socially accepted hypernorm in the HCPS as "producing economic value" and no 
room in this business2  for "sharing the value produced". As is obvious in the WHO definition, the 
hypernorm concerning well-being is too wide-ranging.  As we will demonstrate, it is framed by 
various considerations that could prove to be real dilemmas when addressed.  
Basing our work on the concept presented in the Integrative Social Contracts Theory by Donaldson & 
Dunfee and its contractualism feature (T. Donaldson & Dunfee 1995) (T. Donaldson & Dunfee 1994) 
the ISCT distinguishes hypernorms that belong to the field of general philosophy and impose bounds 
on human activities. They induce implicit "macrosocial contracts" that refer to the classical 
contractarian theory in philosophy and political economy, framing political decisions within nations or 
macro groups. Then comes a dense network of "microsocial contracts" that represents the implicit or 
explicit agreements of members of specific communities and enables different organizations to work 
together. 
What are these "hypernorms" on which "macrosocial contracts" are based? "Patient must come first" is 
the answer of most doctors, nurses, patients and politicians when asked, consistent with the general 
hypernorms on which the Hippocratic oath and the WHO are based. But the leitmotiv of a "patient-
centred system" is the emotional expression of something that matters most to individuals: staying 
                                                        
2 We do not believe that such a simple definition covers the diversity of real business, but it solidly frames strategic 
business management, and the fact that companies exist to create economic value, and that right of property, or the 
production and distribution of economic value, determines a hyper priority for profit purposes. 
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alive - and they have no idea what issues deciders may be faced with when restrictions are imposed on 
the resource allocation process.  And this does not help emergency units when faced with two vitally 
important situations when they are only capable of dealing with one. We will be discussing four of 
those dilemmas in particular, identified thank to our empirical material. The opposition between 
"individuals" and "population" will definitely replace the question of "who" by that of "what" when 
defining stakeholder legitimacy. Then we will be dealing with constituent parts that can be included in 
"what" is legitimate in the decision-making process: bio-medical priorities versus a multidimensional 
approach, innovation versus precaution, short term versus long term. 
Individual versus population. In the medical decision-making process, doctors are responsible for 
interpreting a diagnosis, mobilizing their knowledge and assessing risks for every single patient. 
Evidence-based medicine challenges this individual point of view, while randomising control trials 
and metanalysis (Davidoff et al. 1995) add a collective dimension, and recommendations to a doctor's 
individual expertise. Doctors are constantly exchanging and making decisions that take into account 
their peers' discoveries and opinions (Castel 2005), but promoting an approach aimed at the population 
and based on statistics, as is the case with resource allocation, is a paradigmatic revolution. When one 
type of treatment proves effective on 50 people out of 100 and another type is found to be effective on 
60 people out of 100, it is logical to assume that the second should be favoured, but there is no way of 
knowing if the 50 saved by the first programme would have all been included in the 60 saved by the 
second. So what are the consequences for modern-day patients? 
This aspect questions the acceptability of the cost-efficiency ratio based on bio-medical and collective 
aspects within the "microsocial contract". What would happen if the cost-efficiency ratio of very 
expensive drug desperately needed by patients was to be taken into consideration? As is the case of 
this English patient, a 57-year-old man with metastatic renal cancer, who faced the English NICE3 to 
argue that a particularly expensive drug had stabilized his disease for more than 2 years, during which 
he had continued to work full-time. "The quality of life this drug gives me is priceless" he said. But 
unfortunately, it is not priceless in terms of the common pool resource. Having to deal with often 
irreconcilable aspects is a very real problem within the decision-making process, as NICE's English 
Director Michael Rawling, pointed out "… We are not trying to be unkind or cruel. We are trying to 
look after everybody." (Steinbrook 2008) 
Another example: increasing the access of elderly patients with non-cancerous myelodysplastic 
affections to blood transfusions could help improve their quality of life, but for providers it raises the 
question of blood availability and the consequences of rising prescriptions if blood donors do not 
increase. How do you define a collective priority when forced to share limited resources between 
                                                        
3 NICE : National Institute for Clinical Excellence, an English organization that assesses the feasibility of 
financing new technology by the National Health Service (NHS), the English collective insurance system 
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different types of patients (emergency units, obstetrics, cancer treatment, ailments affecting elderly 
people)? And what are the consequences for individuals or groups that are excluded from treatment? 
The opposition between the individual point of view and a collective approach can currently be 
described through systematic breast cancer screening. Screening is likely to reduce mortality related to 
breast cancer. A recent literary review by the Nordic Cochrane Group revealed that for 2,000 women 
invited for mammography screening over a 10-year period, one will have had her life extended and 10 
healthy women, who would not have been diagnosed if they had not been screened, will have been 
treated unnecessarily. Furthermore, more than 200 women will have been subject to high levels of 
psychological distress over many months due to erroneous cancer detection. It is thus not clear for 
instance whether screening does more good than harm (Gotzsche & Nielsen 2011), although it is a 
good thing for women who avoid more severe forms of breast cancer. 
Adding up the advantages for a population makes sense in terms of medico-economics, but it is not 
easily adapted to the individual practice of medicine, and generates particularly acute ethical 
dilemmas. When two programmes are vying for financing, one that will add 5 years to the lives of 3 
people -that is a total of 15 years of human life- the other that will add 10 years to the life of one 
person, it is difficult to say whether or not the patients and doctors who will be deprived of treatment 
will see the fairness of such a decision. In the late 1980s, the state of Oregon defined its benefit 
package aimed at making more people eligible for Medicaid by ranking 700 diagnoses and treatments 
according to their cost or benefits for the global population. The state legislature then drew a line at 
item 587 which corresponded to the allocated budget; treatment below that line would not be covered 
(Bodenheimer 1997). Evidently, heavy medical treatment with high risks of failure and concerning 
only a small part of the population were ranked at the bottom of the list and not covered through 
Medicaid. Neither were organ transplants. However, in 1987, the case of a 7 year-old boy who died 
because he was refused a bone marrow transplant raised questions about this purely collective 
approach. Such patients would be far luckier if they had ordinary diabetes or breast cancer! 
Restrictions in resources to finance the system reveals that "ethics of individual efficiency" might 
compete with "ethics of efficiency for the health of the whole population" (Maynard 1997) and this is 
challenging the macrosocial contract supporting HCPS financing systems. Individual patients and 
patients that are part of a group of patients suffering from the same pathology may be legitimate or 
not.  The real question is: "Legitimate for what?" 
Bio-medical priorities versus the multidimensional approach. The HCPS, dominated by modern 
medicine, could be presented as focussing on science-related dogma (rather than magic), individual 
concerns (rather than collective), the body (rather than the mind) and technicism (rather than holism) 
(Bozzini et al. 1981), resulting in the paradigm sometimes called a bio-medical paradigm (Vrancken 
1995). Patients are identified according to the individual biological parameters of their disease, by 
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using evidence-based medicine, and this constitutes normative criteria towards promoting efficient 
resource allocation (Cochrane 1972) (Drummond et al. 2005). This means that what should matter is 
not the patient/person himself, but the disease or organ affected by the disease.  
This is not to say that the promoters of such an approach are not conscious of people's needs outside 
medical care. Archie Cochrane, often presented as one of the founder of Evidence-Based Medicine, 
was a humanist, who spent his entire life as a practitioner among Welsh miners. He was very 
conscious of medical needs and the scarcity of resources, and did not accept the idea of wasting money 
on one person when that money could be used to improve the health of the entire population 
(Cochrane 1972). His vision was not based on an ideology of rational bio-medical medicine, but on a 
strategic managerial perspective regarding resource allocation. Ultimately, money must be spent in 
priority on programmes that give the best survival rates. Individual survival is clearly a hypernorm for 
doctors while the survival of a population is a hypernorm for public deciders dealing with resource 
allocation. 
For cancer patients, the question is particularly acute when there is no hope of a cure; and patients and 
relatives need more sociological and psychological support than bio-medical care. Efficient care is 
limited to palliative care and pain management, but curative care such as chemotherapy is sometimes 
maintained, as patients and doctors want to maintain hope or are simply unable to make a firm 
decision. Doctors who have to announce the end of chemotherapy treatments have to face emotionally 
affected patients, and some patients might prefer, as do doctors and families, to pursue unnecessary 
treatment instead of simply giving up hope (C. Koedoot et al. 2003) (H. de Haes & N. Koedoot 2003). 
In every day decisions, care providers attempt to allocate resources not only to prolong life, but to 
provide support to patients and families undergoing very traumatic psychological or social situations. 
One example is a hospital that footed the bill for a woman living in a caravan in the countryside, to 
help her rent facilities so that her son could die "at home", as she could not afford the financial cost of 
spending several days living close to the hospital to be with him. Palliative care exists, but it needs to 
offer more than survival and be less of a struggle to be included in the HCPS. 
As modern medicine now enables people to live with chronic diseases, psychological and sociological 
issues are becoming a real preoccupation for providers. Bio-medical results for organ transplants are 
highly successful, but the psychological dimension must also be taken into account as some people 
have trouble adjusting to the idea of living with someone else's body parts. Since the 1990’s, a 
movement called "patient preference elicitation" has been trying to develop the conditions needed by 
patients to express themselves when placed in a stressful situation, thus attempting to "shared the 
decision" between patients and doctors (Coulter 1999) (Moumjid et al. 2007). When a patient insists 
she would rather not have her breast removed despite the risk involved (n%), although mastectomy 
would only represent a risk of m<n%, she is merely saying that as far as she is concerned, the social 
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and psychological distress are more of a threat to her well-being than the bio-medical threat, and 
challenging the priority given to the survival "hypernorm" when applied to her personally. 
But although bio-medical care can be defined and associated with something we are able to measure, 
such as years of life, other forms of care, such as social and psychological care have no such set 
boundaries. The question of including them in the collective financing system is more difficult now 
than ever before, owing to restrictions and the fact that expenses have to vie with increasingly costly 
technological health innovations. 
Innovation versus precaution. The innovation integration process in our societies is making us all 
schizophrenic. We look to innovation as a last resort to save us from all sorts of dangers, including 
death. Addiction to innovation is growing, influenced by marketing (Deyo 2002) and based on its 
expected economic impact (Felt & Wynne 2007). Healthcare is unable to overlook that pressure, as 
research is urged to find solutions to all life-threatening situations and to urgently apply them to 
patients, while scientists request deadlines to make assessments that are time-consuming or simply 
impossible. (Teutsch et al., 2005)  
As for the consequences of electronics, we continue to live with uncertainty given that the consensus 
of the scientific community is that nobody should make a serious hypothesis before we are able to 
measure changes in diseases in 15 or 20 years' time. Various matters involving chemical and 
pharmaceutical products have given rise to a strange precautionary principle after the event that just 
goes to show how risk adverse we are after the event. The promises of innovation and new 
technologies have become a "hypernorm" in our society inasmuch as we are not really adverse to 
taking risks. We initially oppose resistance, demanding "serious assessment" that cannot be given a 
priori, but we accept that innovation is a risk that has to be taken for the good of humanity. 
But medical decision-making is all about balancing benefits and risks. Although risk is largely 
accepted when lethal consequences are forecast in the short term, the middle or long term effects of 
some treatments might counterbalance some decisions. Striking a balance between quantity and 
quality of life is certainly an issue concerning cancer, which is often painful in the final stages. 
Considering patients receiving chemotherapy, the toxic effects of which is known, the question of 
long-term consequences is now open, seeing as more and more people are being cured. This brings us 
to our last point: our "hypernorms" dilemma elicitation. 
Short-term versus long-term perspectives. People do not seem prepared to abandon the comfortable 
technology of mobile phones. Immediate and real advantages versus future consequences are revealing 
our preference for present versus future. Campaigns undertaken to explain the effects of tobacco on 
health have partly reduced smoking, but some people remain addicted, knowing full well the risks they 
are running, seeing as the relationship between tobacco and lung cancer has now been firmly 
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established. The immediate satisfaction they have of smoking is preferred to the potential impact it 
will have on their health in the future. 
The further prevention requested by the WHO presupposes a preference for the future, whereas 
humans seem to be widely dominated by a preference for the real and pleasant present, which explains 
their dangerous behaviour. It is easier to impose stringent care when patients are faced with potentially 
lethal consequences in the short term. Potentially toxic chemotherapy is accepted despite its side 
effects, when it offers a chance of survival rather than certain death if nothing is attempted. But 
concerning some habit-forming treatment, when there is a risk (but no certainty) of recurrence that the 
drug will attempt to reduce (but not suppress) with potential side effects, the situation is more evenly 
balanced. 
Consequences of the emergence of "macrosocial contracts" It could be said that the dominant 
consensus that is emerging in the decision-making process plumps for bio-
medical/individual/innovation/short term, a position embedded in the cost-effectiveness ratio. But the 
consensus is often challenged, and the decision-making process can do nothing more but be open to 
accept divergence, while every decision is liable to violate one of those contradictory "hypernorms". 
When bio-medical efficiency is ignored by prescribing chemotherapy as a way of supporting final-
stage cancer patients, when money affected to technical care is used to finance psychological support, 
when short-term individual risk is accepted to balance the long-term effect of germ resistance to 
antibiotics, when particularly innovative care is ignored to finance a prevention programme, dilemmas 
are handled differently by different decision-makers.  
The cost-effectiveness ratio, known to be the best use of every euro spent on health care has become a 
powerful argument for promoting new health technologies, and is supported by another consensus that 
is bio-medical/population/innovation/short term. It has grown into a thriving industry (Hollingsworth 
& Street 2006), while the demand seems to be quite low on the producers' side (Hollingsworth 2008). 
Beyond the issue of methodology that affects the scientific discussion regarding the real availability of 
undisputable scientific evidence and despite the useful aspect of this argument in the decision, this 
norm is not so "socially acceptable". Nothing really guarantees that the general objectives of the HCPS 
are working and will achieve its general objective to produce more well-being. And it says nothing 
about the other alternative to resource allocation. 
The biomedical approach can certainly benefit resource allocation, but psychological and sociological 
parameters that escape rational allocation are also important. Just as patients need to be treated with 
humanity and not only as bio-medical problems, so must the common resource pool be used to deal 
with individual needs. As great hope has been placed in innovation despite the fact that risk is 
omnipresent and not always accepted as a consequence of such innovation, preference for the present 
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is not always compatible with the potential long term effect, but then again life is not just a bio-
medical problem.  
For sociologist such as Ulrich Beck (Beck 1992) and Antony Giddens (Giddens 1986), "post-modern" 
societies are having to deal with unstable human frameworks, owing to different factors such as 
cultural pluralism, the complexity of social organizations or a new conscience of risk and uncertainty. 
The HCPS is not devoid of such instability, seeing as uncertainty prevails in many situations and 
scarcity of resources puts the question of efficient resource allocation on the agenda. The decision-
making process becomes a reflexive process towards gaining the upper hand on action and making 
sense of it (Weick 1995) And this means that hypernorms must be discussed and challenged by 
stakeholders in every decision-making process. 
Who can legitimately define priorities and exclusions? The political process can provide a form of 
democratic legitimacy, but won't solve the problem of the multiple decisions that have to be made 
within the system. There is no property right here that allows hierarchical decision, and the 
institutionalisation of key actors appears to be widely insufficient in itself (Sonpar et al. 2010) which 
means that "stakeholders" have to be included in the decision-making process to produce decisions 
that make sense and are accepted as such. Management frameworks cannot be based solely on 
"stakeholder identity", and "who" will be served, but "what" will be served; so more than stakeholder 
identity, we need to explore stakeholder expectations.  
3) From the complex "macrosocial contract" to the consequences of the drawing 
up of “microsocial contracts": normative or derivative stakeholders’ 
expectations 
Just as those "hypernorms" leave room for discussion regarding "macrosocial contracts", they are also 
proving a dilemma to “microsocial contracts” and actors have plenty to consider given the wide range 
of "stakeholder" expectations. Because of these dilemmas, "stakeholder" discussions could be 
difficult, but the contradictions in the norms that bound rationality cannot be solved without freedom 
to discuss how such norms can be applied to decision-making. To be manageable, some normative 
considerations must emerge from the discussion. Not definitely, as it would not be acceptable to 
choose between those dilemmas, but temporarily, to be able to make acceptable any single decision. 
One of those discussions focuses on the goals of the decision-making process, both in terms of general 
philosophical considerations and pragmatics, which have to be evenly balanced and settled in this 
situation, as something has to go. As the social psychology of fairness suggests, people are concerned 
about the fairness of the distribution process itself (Greenberg 1990) (Colquitt et al. 2001), and accept 
poor outcomes in their perspective when the procedure for distribution is thought to be fair (Lind & 
Tyler 1988). In this perspective, a wide range of stakeholders must be represented in such a context.  
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Goals that stem from hypernorms often alter according to priorities and allow for more flexibility in 
the way resources are allocated or appropriated. In addition to hypernorms, the HCPS includes a wide 
range of interlinked objectives other than life expectancy (ways of measuring created value), such as 
incomes for doctors and nurses, profit for pharmaceutical companies and even economic growth for 
countries (both a consequence and condition of the value creating process). Economics and ethics 
cannot be treated separately. 
Resource-based perspectives give the upper hand to some stakeholders managing key-resources, 
enabling them to reap the benefits of created value while other have little possibility of being able to 
assess just how much value is bypassing them in the process (Coff 1999). Despite the existence of 
powerful hypernorms, decisions might be made that disregard the main objectives of the system itself. 
The process is very efficiently geared in favour of discreetly dominant stakeholders, or those who 
frankly impose conditions on the decision-making process while overlooking patients, whose ability to 
assert their claims remain limited (Elms et al. 2002). While many actors might claim their legitimacy, 
policymakers, and all stakeholders involved are not simply responding to "problems" that exist within 
the community, but are also actively framing problems (Greenhalgh & Russell 2009) adding a wide 
range of claims to the final goal of saving years of life. Such dilemmas require that specific goals are 
defined by the stakeholders themselves, and justified in front of a democratic community.  
There is no major ethical consideration needed to organise access to products or services that are not 
vital for people, such as owning a car or being able to go on holiday, yet giving people access to 
effective care when they are dying and could be saved by such care is a major problem. Drugs are 
assessed in the following terms: are they efficient enough to warrant public financing? Lobbying on 
the part of the pharmaceutical industry during the last influenza pandemic for example, is now 
considered to have imposed illegitimate expectations. The question of sovereignty does of course 
belong to political science. But the question of major decisions and trends must be solved, at least 
partly, before any management process can be launched by the political decision-making process, or 
by empowering a collective decision-making process made up of legitimate participants (experts, 
citizens…). Sovereignty is thus partly transferred to the stakeholders in charge of supervising the 
system, the counterpart being the transparency of decisions. 
Focusing on stakeholders in the HCPS's decision-making process is a great challenge for collective 
resource governance, but without a normative approach, we can only agree with Philips when he says 
it is a useless approach, seeing as all potential stakeholders have different expectations.  
Stakeholders' expectations and the rest of the world. The stakeholders in question can't just 
supervise a system and decide for the rest of society that expenses simply have to be increased to 
satisfy their unlimited needs. Those obliged to vie with the HCPS for common resource pools are not 
stakeholders, but people under potential threat, so that ethics with regard to the rest of the world has 
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now become the main aim of the closed world of HCPS management. This is very much a current 
issue, the potentially unlimited and voracious expenses of which will soon be on par with other 
common resource pools such as education or social expenditure for example. Managers at every level, 
including key constituents representing insurers or government agencies, must deal with strategic and 
ethical problems embedded in the decision-making process. A wider normative approach mapping 
stakeholder expectancy is a necessity, in view of the great influence it has on local managerial 
practices (Elms et al. 2002). It doesn't intend to replace the deliberative decision-making process 
necessary to political choices, but to contribute to HCPS management, once decisions have been made 
by the relevant authorities (public or private insurers or agencies) or to replace decisions that have not 
been made for some reason or another (the political agenda for example). When capacities are reduced 
in emergency units owing to political decisions, and doctors have more patients than they are able to 
deal with, they are obliged to decide who will be treated first and who will not receive treatment. They 
make their decisions alone and risk being exposed to legal action in the future. It is not ethical to force 
doctors to be solely responsible for what should be a collective decision regarding priority. One of the 
consequences of such a situation is that more and more doctors could refuse to ensure emergency 
services. 
Our research attempts to clarify the role of stakeholders, proposing a comprehensive mapping model 
of the identities, expectations, and perspectives of HCPS stakeholders. We believe that creating more 
transparency to that end will be more efficient for the decision-making process than the current and 
usual statement of interest. Phillips suggests that stakeholders may be usefully divided up into 
normative and derivative stakeholders. "Normative stakeholders are those to whom the organization 
has a direct moral obligation to attend to their wellbeing. Alternatively, derivative stakeholders are 
those groups or individuals who can either harm or benefit the organization, but to whom the 
organization has no direct moral obligation as stakeholders. The organization is not managed for the 
benefit of derivative stakeholders, but to the extent that they may influence the organization or its 
normative stakeholders, managers are obliged to account for them in their decision-making. Far from 
strict equality, therefore, there are a number of more convincing ways that Stakeholder Theory may 
distinguish between and among constituency groups." (Phillips 2003) We suggest taking stakeholder 
expectations into consideration as well as stakeholder identity, seeing as we believe the latter is 
insufficient.  
From goals to side effects. What HCPS goals should be considered? The answer is keeping people 
alive and alleviating their pain when they have a disease or a physical or psychological ailment. This 
includes "achieving or maintaining health status", "the recovery process" and sustaining health" 
throughout time (Porter 2010) with regard to the bio-medical aspect, but in some cases it also means 
maintaining whatever life is possible when no cure is available. Because it is difficult to clearly and 
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directly measure the effectiveness of care, conceptual frameworks generally include the measurement 
of intermediate objectives.  
Results are therefore mainly oriented towards measuring the efficiency of the processes, like hospital 
resource availability, delays for treatment or nosocomial infections. These secondary objectives assess 
the activities involved in the process of achieving ultimate goals. They describe the means to reach the 
ends, such as the rate of vaccination or the level of access to care, both of which are linked to the final 
expected outcome, which is to reduce the number of deaths from disease. Most countries use this kind 
of framework (Arah et al. 2003) to describe the causal chain of objectives. 
But they also split into different sub-objectives and side-objectives. For instance, to improve 
performance, hospitals must organize human resources and develop staff training. Good training is 
therefore a sub-objective for hospitals. But this increases staff skills, who then expect a better salary as 
a side-objective. Figure 1 summarizes this aspect. The causal chain, from sub-objectives to final ends 
of the HCPS, represented on the left side, are known as "normative expectations" and the side-
objectives that are contingent to the existence of the causality chain are presented on the right side, and 
known as "derivative expectations". 
Figure 1: Ends and means in the causality chain, contingencies and consequences 
 
 
In the meantime, representatives who have to manage economic growth, employment and the HCPS, 
and might simply choose to preserve employment in their region, which would imply that they are 
defending a local hospital rather than the efficiency of the health system in general. 
Private profit-making health providers must satisfy their shareholders' dividend expectations even 
when short-term profits are a potential threat to long-term health outcomes. This is an inescapable side 
effect of a private profit-making sector in healthcare provision, just as side revenues (expected by 
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nurses, doctors, or any other members of staff) are a logical consequence of HCPS staffing 
requirements. Healthcare by public providers is not exempt from its own side effects, with doctors 
seeking personal notoriety, or the fact that public hospitals employ a large section of the population in 
small towns, as is the case in France for example, illustrates just one such contingent objective. Some 
hospitals may perform poorly in terms of health service performance but may fill a socio-economic 
mission. Those side-objectives impact the strategies of health service providers (in the sense that they 
create externalities) and can be viewed as a constraint.  
Multiple causality chains complicate the situation, opposing arguments about the effects of causal 
chains. It is easy to confuse circular causality chains with final outcomes and to point out the 
counterproductive effects of management measures. The conflicts and trade-offs between the different 
objectives will not necessarily lead to compliance with health outcome purposes. For instance, the 
cost-shifting phenomenon (choosing patients who will generate profit rather than those likely to suffer 
from complications) is a side effect that could have a negative impact on health (Meyer & Johnson 
1983). The corollary of this is the risk that side-objectives substitute for secondary objectives, so that 
the decision may be influenced by an inversion of finalities/externalities. Externalities become a major 
priority (making money and prosperity through innovation) whereas finalities (improving patients' 
quality of life in the long term) will be attained later, and too late for assessment. Finalities then 
become a mere pretext, which may appear legitimate in the short term.  
Stakeholders' identity and the legitimacy of their expectations: The consequence of such analysis 
is that normative and derivative are embedded in the expectations rather than in the identity of a given 
stakeholder, and must be a part of the managerial approach of decision-making processes.  
For the purpose of our demonstration, let's first examine the case of patients. To some extent and 
according to the current dominant consensus people should not be seen as people but as "shareholders" 
within the system, considered solely in the light of their biomedical parameters. But as individuals 
expecting to receive care in order to avoid early death they are also legitimately entitled to expect a 
certain quality of life. They are derivative stakeholders when extra medical care is required and a 
collective decision decides not to pay for some of that treatment in favour of another part of the 
population, the suffering of which is greater or simply because it could be used to treat a greater 
number of patients. But as we explain below, in so doing they are excluded, and therefore cease to be 
"stakeholders", when expressing expectations unrelated to the HCPS, like taking advantage of their 
illness to stop work because they do not find their job interesting, or asking for personal attention that 
exceeds the capacity of the system in question. For cancer patients receiving terminal care, the 
question is emotionally expressed by care providers: "How can we say 'no' to someone who is going to 
die, and continue to care for them, when this is in violation of our 'hypernorm'?" The question that 
counterbalances that feeling of violating a "hypernorm" is how fairly resources are allocated to other 
patients who also need them, which is far less discussed with regard to the individual perspective than 
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the collective approach. To be socially acceptable, a decision has to be fair, and conditions must be 
transparent. 
Close relatives, directly impacted by a patient's disease and care, are subject to increasing demand on 
the part of the HCPS to be actively involved in patient care, especially in the case of chronic diseases. 
They have specific expectations, which are different from those of the patients themselves, and 
considering the part they play, some expectation are normative. For Alzheimer or Muscular Dystrophy 
for instance, parents and relatives handle the question of care with organizations that collect private 
funds for research and care treatment to compensate for the lack of a publicly available common 
resource pool. In some cases, they end up becoming patients themselves due to the distress and disease 
caused by having to care for patients. 
Providers are diverse: doctors, nurses, and other staff in charge of patient care, sometimes working 
alone, or as part of an institution such as a hospital, pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries 
or logistic providers such as ambulance workers. As they work within the system and provide care or 
products for the sake of patients, they are normative stakeholders. But let's take a look for example at 
the case of pharmaceutical industries seeking to justify high prices for the sake of their shareholders. 
When do they become derivative for having unacceptable expectations? And what of core skills that 
are necessary, specific and in some cases scarce, and cannot be done without, and therefore give some 
providers the upper hand when negotiating resource allocation, as highlighted by the resource-based 
approach. This obliges managers to take them into account in their decision-making processes, but it 
remains a derivative interest and the question of what is acceptable and what is not is forever under 
discussion. Two years ago, and prior to negotiation, the French Minister of Health publicly presented 
statistics on the rise in doctors' wages over the past years, as a way of obtaining a political advantage 
in the discussion, arguing that doctors had in no way been wronged during this difficult period. Yet so 
far, the question of pharmaceutical industries constantly asserting that innovation requires increasing 
sums of money has not been seriously challenged. 
Public authorities, and especially those representing voters, are faced with complex constraints related 
to economic development, employment and town-and-country planning. With more that 10% of the 
GDP, they are never completely isolated from the rest of the socio-economic world. But while 
preoccupation for the public health status of the population makes them normative stakeholders, the 
expectations they have for socio-economic consequences remain derivative. 
And all those involved: patients, close relatives, providers, industrial companies, etc., belong to 
different socio-economic groups that have their own dynamics. This heterogeneity implies that there 
are different interests and contradictions within the community that will bring derivative interest to the 
system, sometimes hidden by their normative legitimacy as patient or providers. Of course, statements 
Working Paper – Buthion – 2011 – Page  
 
made regarding conflict of interest were an important step, but remain insufficient: "stakeholders" 
cannot be dealt with in the sole light of their identity; their expectations must also be supervised.  
Conclusion:  
Diversifying the stakeholders involved, as suggested by Sutton and al, is surely a good point, though it 
may not be sufficient, in the same way as identifying conflicts of interest is insufficient. Identifying 
who can decide and defend a final outcome in such a complex relationship of cause and effect is not 
exactly consensual, as we have shown and far from simple and the decision must surely not be left to 
the discretion of small-empowered groups, including in some cases public institutions and 
bureaucratic agencies. By way of a conclusion we believe that whoever is involved in HCPS 
management will need to be equipped to handle discussions and choices to deal with contradictory 
"hypernorms" and stakeholders' normative and derivative expectations. Adding more "stakeholders" to 
decision-making processes will not automatically lead to more acceptable solutions and it could even 
add more conflict or more situations in which "stakeholders" will be banding up against others. 
Increasing the number of stakeholders will require even more transparency in the expectations framing 
discussions.  
The existence of dilemmas and contradictions doesn't mean that every citizen is entitled to "help 
themselves" from the common resource pool that is intended to ensure access to care for all. We 
believe that mapping expectations thanks to Stakeholder Theory framework is an appropriate way of 
understanding the internal workings of the process, especially when final outcomes are vying with side 
objectives, and inversions between final outcomes and intermediate outcomes or side objectives are 
possible. Introducing more stakeholders implies a new framework of understanding and new cognitive 
shapes in the decision-making process. It is necessary to "map" the goals of common resource pools 
on the one hand and stakeholders' objectives and constraints on the other through a normative 
approach. This suggests re-examining democratic governance processes in the future, to rethink 
resource allocation decisions and manage available resources and interrelations in a sustainable way, 
along with their contradictions and expectations and make acceptable sacrifices based on the resource 
allocation process. 
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